Fred got on the train. *Fred got in the train.
Fred got in the car. *Fred got on the car.
The difference, according to McGuire, reflects the fact that one only uses 'get on' when one can stand up in the thing, 'get in' when one can't. This solution is neat, but wrong.
The problems arise if one considers other cases. For example, the sentence:
Fred got on the stool is acceptable and may mean that he sat on it in the usual way. Of course, you can stand on a stool, which correctly predicts: The only way in which you make sense of: *Fred is in the stool is by imagining either that he has somehow inserted himself between its legs or else that he is a Lilliputian who has got in some hollow part of it. The case ofx is on y is more complicated, because it appears to have an ambiguity that is relevant to the analysis. This last example uses the verb to get, which can be paraphrased as x does something that causes x to be in a certain state, and accordingly x gets in y means that x causes x to be in y, whereas x gets on y means x causes x to be on y. It follows according to this analysis that:
Fred got on the train is an acceptable but ambiguous sentence: he may have boarded the train in the usual way or, rather more unconventionally, he may have got on its roof. Likewise, the sentence:
Fred got in the train is acceptable (pace McGuire) and describes the act of boarding it; the usage is more acceptable in England, where platforms exist, than in America, where the notion of climbing up into the train suggests getting up onto it. The sentence:
Fred got in the car is an acceptable way of describing the usual way of entering a vehicle. Finally:
Fred got on the car means that he got on its roof, because cars are too small to be treated as conceptual surfaces.
This account is hardly the last word on the semantics of prepositions, but at least it allows us to draw a moral: what seemed like a neat solution was so only because the problem was small. In trying to find a more adequate solution, one is forced willy-nilly to consider an ever wider range of phenomena, the problem soon ceases to be small. To account for a simple verb and preposition, one is forced to consider other verbs and other prepositions, tests for ambiguity as opposed to indeterminacy, and the conception of three-dimensional objects as surfaces. This growth in complexity seems a characteristic of considering any aspect of human mentality. There may not be many small problems in cognitive science, or any neat solutions to them in Cognitive Science.
